

Environmental Assessment

Pigouvian tax




Figure: With adjustments taken from Endres (2022)

Pigouvian tax and subsidy




Figure: With adjustments taken from Endres (2022)

MAC, MSC – exercise

Assume a market under perfect competition with supply

$$p = \frac{1}{2}E + 2$$

and demand

$$p = 20 - E.$$

Marginal damage from emissions corresponds to

$$MD = \frac{5}{2}E.$$

- a) Calculate the market equilibrium E^*
- b) Derive marginal abatement cost MAC and marginal social cost MSC .
- c) Calculate the socially optimal emission E^{**} level using a) MAC and b) MSC .

Pigouvian tax – exercise

Assume a model economy with a sector producing an output X proportional to emissions E ($E = e \cdot X$ with $e = 1$). The maximum emissions of the sector equal 6 ($0 \leq E \leq 6$). Marginal abatement costs of the sector are

$$600 - 100E$$

while damage from emissions equals

$$D(E) = 25E^2$$

- Calculate marginal damage MD .
- Calculate the socially optimal output level of the company.
- What is the tax rate of a Pigouvian tax?
- Illustrate your results.
- What happens if the government abolishes the tax and introduces a subsidy $s = 100$?

Policy instruments for emission reduction

- obligations
 - define a threshold value or intensity for **every emitter**
- taxes/subsidies
 - defining a tax/subsidy rate t/s which results in a certain emission level E'
 - ⇒ partial internalization if $t < MD(E^{**})$
- allowances or emission certificates
 - define a threshold value E' or intensity for **a sector, countries, the world** allowing trade between emitters
 - ⇒ partial internalization if $E' > E^{**}$)

Degree of internalization

- The degree of internalization can be defined as

$$\Delta(E') := \frac{IC(E')}{AC(0, E')}. \quad (1)$$

with $IC(E') = T$.

- For

$$p(E') = MAC(E') = d(E^* - E')^n \quad \forall n > 0 \quad (2)$$

price p or tax rate t are sufficient indicators for the degree of internalization

Choice of policy instruments

- Which policy instrument to choose with respect to
 - efficiency
 - innovation incentives
 - accuracy

- What about a combination of policy instruments?

Policy instruments – efficiency




Figure: With adjustments taken from Endres (2022)

Policy instruments – exercise

Assume two countries 1 and 2 with different MAC and emissions E_1 and E_2

$$MAC_1 = 20 - 2E_1$$

$$MAC_2 = 10 - E_2$$

Assume no emission abatement in the business as usual scenario.

- Calculate the amount of emissions in the business as usual scenario
- Assume an obligation for both countries to cut emissions by 45 %. Calculate abatement costs (AC) for both countries and in total.

Policy instruments – exercise

Assume two countries 1 and 2 with different MAC and emissions E_1 and E_2

$$MAC_1 = 20 - 2E_1$$

$$MAC_2 = 10 - E_2$$

Instead of an obligation, emission allowances are introduced. Assume each country is assigned free certificates for 55 % of their emissions. Their shall be perfect competition at the allowance market.

- c) Calculate the price for allowances
- d) Are allowances traded? Which country is buying and which country is selling certificates? What is the impact?
- e) Calculate AC after introduction of emissions trading. Compare it to AC in an obligation framework.

Policy instruments – exercise

Assume two countries 1 and 2 with different MAC and emissions E_1 and E_2

$$MAC_1 = 20 - 2E_1$$

$$MAC_2 = 10 - E_2$$

Now free assignment of allowances is exchanged by auctioning off emission certificates.

- f) Does the introduction of auctions for emission certificates change emissions of the two countries?
- g) Calculate total cost C for each country after introduction of auctions for certificates.
- h) Assume that country 2 after negotiations is allowed to cut emissions by 25 % instead of 45 %. How does it affect the two countries' trading balance?

References

ENDRES, A. (2022). *Umweltökonomie*. Kohlhammer.