

Environmental Assessment

Policy instruments – exercise

Assume two countries 1 and 2 with different MAC and emissions E_1 and E_2

$$MAC_1 = 20 - 2E_1$$

$$MAC_2 = 10 - E_2$$

Now free assignment of allowances is exchanged by auctioning off emission certificates.

- f) Does the introduction of auctions for emission certificates change emissions of the two countries?
- g) Calculate total cost C for each country after introduction of auctions for certificates.
- h) Assume that country 1 after negotiations is allowed to cut emissions by 25 % instead of 45 %. How does it affect the two countries' trading balance?

Policy instruments – innovation incentives




Figure: With adjustments taken from Endres (2022)

Policy instruments – time sequence

- ETS and emission tax have advantages with respect to efficiency when compared to obligations
 - without adjustments innovation incentives are highest for the emission tax
 - accuracy is highest for obligations and the ETS
 - investment incentives are best for an emission tax
- ⇒ close to E^* the emission tax is superior to the other policy instruments while later the ETS is superior

Absolute versus intensity caps

- an ETS can introduce an absolute emission cap E' or a threshold value for the emission intensity e'

$$e = \frac{E}{Y} \quad (1)$$

→ Y corresponds to the output

⇒ emission intensity has the unit e.g. [g/kWh]

- Is it better to install an absolute cap or an intensity-based cap?

Absolute versus intensity caps

- emissions abatement with an absolute cap equals

$$A^A = E^* - E' \quad (2)$$

→ E^* indicates the emission level in the business-as-usual scenario (BAU-scenario) without ETS and

→ E' corresponds to the absolute emission cap

- emissions abatement with an intensity-based cap equals

$$A^I = E^* - e' Y \quad (3)$$

→ e' corresponds to the intensity-based emission cap

→ Y corresponds to the output level after introduction of the ETS

Intermediate objectives and uncertainty

- emissions abatement with an absolute cap

$$E[A^A] = E[E^*] - E' \quad (4)$$

→ $E[\]$ indicates an expectation value

- emissions abatement with an intensity-based cap

$$E[A^I] = E[E^*] - e' E[Y] \quad (5)$$

→ $E[A]$ is the decisive variable to counteract climate change!

Deviation from optimal objectives

- variance for emissions abatement with an absolute cap

$$\text{var}[A^A] = \text{var}[E^*] \quad (6)$$

- emissions abatement with an intensity-based cap

$$\text{var}[A^I] = \text{var}[E^*] - 2e' \text{cov}[E^*, Y] + e'^2 \text{var}[Y] \quad (7)$$

⇒ Is the variance lower with an absolute emission cap or an intensity-based emission cap?

Minimizing deviations

- If the variance for an intensity-based emission cap is lower than for an absolute emission cap, we receive

$$\begin{aligned} \text{var}[A^I] &< \text{var}[A^A] \\ \Rightarrow e'^2 \text{var}[Y] &< 2e' \text{cov}[Y, E^*] \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \frac{\nu[Y]}{\nu[E^*]\rho[Y, E^*]} \frac{E'}{E[E^*]} < 2 \quad (9)$$

$$\Rightarrow \xi \frac{E'}{E[E^*]} < 2 \quad (10)$$

\Rightarrow approach follows Sue Wing *et al.* (2009)

Excursus – basic statistics

- variance

$$\text{var}[x] = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n (x_i - E[x])^2 \quad (11)$$

→ quadratic deviation from the expectation value

- standard deviation

$$s[x] = \sqrt{\text{var}[x]} \quad (12)$$

→ standardized deviation in “right units”

Excursus – basic statistics

- coefficients of variation

$$\nu[x] = \frac{s[x]}{E[x]} \quad (13)$$

→ relative standard deviation from the expectation value

Excursus – basic statistics

- covariance

$$\text{cov}[x, y] = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n (x_i - E[x])(y_i - E[y]) \quad (14)$$

- joint variance of two variables
- high positive values indicate “simultaneous deviations” of the two variables indicating a correlation

- coefficient of determination

$$\rho[x, y] = \frac{\text{cov}[x, y]}{s[x]s[y]} \quad (15)$$

- standardized correlation with values between -1 and 1

Minimizing deviations – exercise

Assume the expectation value approximately corresponds to the ten year average with a time lag of three years.

- Use the data for the German electricity market to calculate ξ for the years 2007 until 2024
- Illustrate your results in an appropriate diagram.
- What do you think about the approximation?

Introducing emissions trading in the EU

- burden sharing agreement in June 1998
 - the European Commission released a paper in June 1998 which stated that “the Community could set up its own internal trading regime by 2005”
 - in 1999 the “could” turned into “should” (Convery, 2009)
 - in March 2000 the so-called “Green Paper” was released by the European Commission
- According to Convery (2009) *“the tone and tenor of the paper assumed that the decision to proceed and establish a Community wide emissions trading scheme had already been taken”*
- possibility to allocate certificates based on historical emissions
- ⇒ emissions cap is based on absolute emissions

From proposal to enactment

- the EU ETS started on January 1, 2005
- pilot period (2005-2007)
- National Allocation Plans (NAPs) on a national level, consisting of a macro- and a micro-plan, had to be established
- certificates, also called European Allowances (EUAs), were not transferable to the 2nd trading period (2008-2012)
- allocation of certificates was free (grandfathering)

EUA price development




Figure: Development of the allowance price of the EU ETS between April 25, 2005 and December 6, 2023. Own illustration based on investing.com (2023).

Implementation in Germany

- EUAs were allocated based on historic emissions between 2000 and 2002 (base period) (Federal Ministry for the Environment, 2004, p. 8)
 - Germany's NAP intended a reduction from assumed 501 Mt/year in the base period to 489 Mt/year with a reserve of 10 Mt/year for new emitters (Federal Ministry for the Environment, 2004, p. 22)
- ⇒ intended minimum reduction was 0.4 %
- In retrospect, it turned out, that emissions of the base period were only 482.4 Mt/year (Federal Ministry for the Environment, 2006, p. 49, footnote 14)
- ⇒ instead of 0.4 % reduction there was an increase of 1.4 %
- excessive EUAs were present all over the EU

2nd trading period 2008-2012

- more facilities included in the EU ETS
- ⇒ base period emissions increase to 493.4 Mt/year (Federal Ministry for the Environment, 2006)
- intended reduction objective was 482 Mt/year (2.3 %)
- NAP was rejected by the European Commission (2006) because likely emission reductions which are not induced by the EU ETS were not considered
- The Commission claimed at least to consider an annual decrease in emission intensity (ratio of emissions and GDP) of 0.5 %
- ⇒ revised NAP intended a reduction to 453.1 Mt/year (8.2 %) (Federal Ministry for the Environment, 2007)
- introduction of the Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)

Joint Implementation and Clean Development Mechanism

- counting credits carried out in developing and emerging countries towards emissions in the EU
- Certified Emission Reductions (CERs)
- Emission Reduction Units (ERUs)
- ⇒ 1.445 billion CERs and ERUs were used in the EU until April 30, 2015

3rd trading period 2013-2020

- establishment of an EU-wide cap

⇒ no NAPs anymore

- cap is reduced by a linear factor amounting to 1.74 % of averaged emissions of the 2nd trading period starting from 2010 (European Commission, 2010)

$$\Rightarrow E_{2013} = (1 - 3 \cdot 0.0174) \bar{E}_{2008-2012} = 2,084,301,856$$

⇒ annual reduction of 38,264,246

- the number of CERs and ERUs valid in the EU ETS has been limited
- requirements for admission of projects counting credits towards the EU has been tightened (European Commission, 2013)

4th trading period 2021-2030

- further use of an EU-wide cap
- the reduction factor of the cap is reduced is increased from 1.74 % to 2.2 %

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